

## Bottlenecks in Transmission Systems

# The reliable Grid -

From **Blackout** towards a **“Smart Grid”**

# Das sichere Netz -


vom **Blackout** zum **“Smart Grid”**



## Power Transmission and Distribution

*Dusan Povh - Dietmar Retzmann*

S  
High Voltage





# Power System Development: The Key-Issue - How to avoid **Bottlenecks**

## Globalisation/ Liberalisation

**Deregulation - Privatization:** Opening of the Markets, Independent Transmission Companies ITCs, Regional Transmission Organisations RTOs

## Bottlenecks in Transmission

Problem of uncontrolled **Loop Flows**  
**Overloading & Excess of SCC\* Levels**  
System **Instabilities & Outages**

## Investments in Power Systems

**System Enhancement & Interconnections:**

- ◆ **Higher Voltage Levels \*\***
- ◆ **New Transmission Technologies**
- ◆ **Renewable Energies**

**\*\* Example UCTE: 400 kV is actually too low**

**\* SCC = Short-Circuit Current**



# Development of Power Systems

**Extensions of Interconnected Systems**

**Increased Power Exchange among Interconnected Systems**

**Transmission of large Power Blocks over long Distances (Hydro Resources)**

**Decentralized Power Generation**



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
# Problems in large Power Systems

- **Increasing loading at low investment into the system**
- **Complex configuration**
- **Change of transmission directions due to new generation locations (wind generation) and system interconnections**
- **Weak interconnections among the systems**
- **Stability and oscillation problems because of long transmission distances**
- **Distributed and not coordinated system controls**



# The Gap – between Consumption & Investments

## Example 1: United States




Source: VDN/ETG Fachtagung 10-11 Feb. 2004 Jena, Germany



# The Gap – between Consumption & Investments


Example 2: Germany – similar Tendency, just “later” and “smoother”







# The UCTE Structures – in Details




(c)- centralised L-F control

(p)- pluralistic L-F control

(h)- hierarchical L-F control

**2<sup>nd</sup> zone: presently separated from the rest of UCTE**



— Block coordinator

— Coordination made in RWE Brauweiler

— Coordination made in ETRANS Laufenburg

— Coordination made in EKC Beograd


\* L: industrial net with B, public net with D

# DK: Continental part (ELTRA- associated member) only

◇ BiH partly with HR, partly with EKC




# European Grids – in Details







# Congestion also in West-Europe (UCTE): 400 kV AC Voltage is too **low** !




# Interconnection Spain-France: a **weak Link**

Understanding UCTE ...

Waiting for a new 400 kV Line ?

...or using **FACTS** and **HVDC**?



In UCTE, Load Flow is decisive for **System Stability**



“Stable” Power Flow: 1500 - 2000 MW. Stability Limit: 0 MW  
System unstable in Case of Power Reversal





# The Risk: Inter-Area Oscillation in UCTE

**An Example:  
Trip of 300 MW Power Station  
in Spain**




Signals: simulated & measured by WAMS

**Mode 1:  $f = 0.21$  Hz, Damping  $\zeta = -3.7$  %**



# Large Synchronous Systems - Risk of Spread of Disturbances

Figure 5. Modeling failure for Western System breakup of August 10, 1996. (MW on California-Oregon Interconnection)





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# Classification of **Stability Problems** in Power Systems

*Overview about basic Problems in Terms of Physics, which are related to a high Loading of Transmission Systems by Transport of electrical Energy.*

## **The main Types of Instability Concerns are:**


- **Cascading Line Tripping** by **Overload** or **wrong Protection Settings**
- **Loss of Synchronism** due to **Angle Instability**
- **Oscillatory Instability** causing self exciting **Inter-Area Oscillations**
- **Exceeding of the allowed Frequency Range** (Over- and Under-Frequency), causing **Generator Trips**
- **Voltage Collapse**



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# Reasons for **high Probability** of large Blackouts

- Systems **too complex** to be tested properly (Protection, Controls)
- **Insufficient Investments** into the System (heavily loaded Network Elements)
- Lack in **Maintenance**
- Insufficient **Training**
- Human **Errors**



Source:

22 IEEE Spectrum | August 2004 | NA






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# The Blackout Area - a "Daylight" View

## NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRICITY GRID





# The US-Canada Blackout - from 12 to 4 PM

the **“Result”**


4:13 PM – Cascading sequence essentially complete

**4 hrs. – a very long Time**

12:05:44 – 1:31:34 PM – Generator trips

1. 12:05:44 – Conesville Unit 5 (rating 375 MW)
2. 1:14:04 – Greenwood Unit 1 (rating 785 MW)
3. 1:31:34 – Eastlake Unit 5 (rating: 597 MW)

**How it “started”**



Transmission Lines	Events
<span style="color: green;">—</span> 765 kV	<span style="color: magenta;">—</span> Line opening
<span style="color: orange;">—</span> 500 kV	<span style="color: black;">—</span> Path opening
<span style="color: red;">—</span> 345 kV	<span style="color: red;">●</span> Generator trip
<span style="color: blue;">—</span> 230 kV	<span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">1</span> → Event number

**Now some Details - the Sequence of Events ...**






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# Event 18 in the ITC-Analysis: 30 s to Blackout

About 1 Minute Later...

4:10:40 - 4:10:46 PM

- ❑ The ITC system is now in full voltage collapse (rapid decline) causing 30 Transmission lines in Michigan to go out of service in less than 8 seconds
- ❑ Connections between METC and ITC go out of service, isolating ITC from the rest of Michigan
- ❑ FirstEnergy is still pulling power through Michigan, but suddenly the only route for the power to flow is through Ontario and Michigan
- ❑ Flows over the ITC - IMO international connection spike to nearly 2800 MW affecting New York, other states and Ontario



Time to Blackout  
t= -0:00:30


Time data extracted from numerous computer systems and therefore may not exactly match other sources.





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# The Blackout – Breaking News ...



*... the Leaders are concerned*





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# The Blackout - some more "Daylight" Views

*Transportation, however, goes on ...*

*... just by different Means*

*... Traffic Jam*



*"Activities" in New York City ...*



*Communication - highly important*





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# The Blackout - some more "Daylight" Views

*In spite of this ...*

**Al Qaida** claims responsibility for blackout


SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM

*and a high Degree of Discipline everywhere !*

*many Helpers*



*Subway and Train Systems broke down, but Streets keep on moving*








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# The **Blackout Area** - a "Nightlight" View

003 / 45 / 7844

"modified" Satellite Photo



*Some of the Reasons were:*

- **Overloads** and **Loop Flows**
- Leading to **Voltage Collapse**

**A view on the 8-14-2003 Event**


ISAT GeoStar 45  
23:15 EST 14 Aug. 2003




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# The Area of the **Blackout** - the "real" Photos

**Blackout: a large Area is out of Supply**



Québec's HVDCs assist for Power Supply and System Restoration



However, some Islands still have local Supply

**Before the Blackout**

Source: EPRI 2003



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# The Blackout: some more "Nightlight" Views



*When Night falls - Skylines  
in Toronto and New York*





# 6 Weeks after the US Blackout - a large **Blackout** in Italy ...

... the **Risk for a Spread of Disturbance to UCTE was high**

*Europe needs Enhancements, too*

**... Similar Events and Root Causes**



**From "White Night" to "Black Night"**






# UCTE: Sequence of Events on the Interconnections

**Sunday 28.09.2003: Sequence of events (line trippings)**

20 min. after the 1<sup>st</sup> Line Trip:  
Loss of a 2<sup>nd</sup> Line ... and then a  
very fast cascading Sequence

starting at 03:01 a.m



**Timeline: Initial UCTE Press Release 09-29-2003**





# A view on the 380 kV Lukmanier Line ...

*Lessons Learned:* Power Systems have not been designed for “wide-Area” Energy Trading with daily varying Load Patterns

... near the Tree Flashover

Event **1**

Source: Cigré Paris Session 2004

A Key-Issue in many Power Systems today:

**SIEMENS**

The Grids are “close to their Limits”





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# Effect of System Loading on Stability Margin

*The transmission distance of **considerable power transfer** of **6.7 GW** from the generation located in Central Europe to the consumers in Italy led to a relatively **high phase angle difference** in the **stationary parallel operation** between the **UCTE main grid**:*


- the **immediate reconnection** of the line tripping first was **not possible** because of a steady state **phase angle difference** higher than expected
- the **cascading line tripping** evolved into a much more severe **angle stability problem**.



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# The "Blackout-Story" *goes on ...*

When **Ice**, **Snow** and **Storm** exceed the "Design Criteria"



***Münsterland, Germany, Nov. 25-30, 2005:***

**600,000 People without Electricity initially,**




**250,000 for 3 Days und 90,000 up to 4 Days**


**SIEMENS**

***System fully restored after 6 Days***





-  Area 1 under frequency
-  Area 2 over frequency
-  Area 3 over frequency





## Sequence of events:

At 21:38h, both circuits of a 380-kV-line were switched off in order to secure the passing of the Ems river by a ship.

A routine simulation of the switching-off of the a.m. line was computed in advance and did not bring up concerns about this switching maneuver.


Following the switching-off of the said line, the energy flow was transferred to other lines in the South.

This situation was still stable.



# The outage as seen from RTE, the French TSO

Power demand graph of day : 04/11/2006






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## What can actually be done ? Are other large Systems in the World Safe ?

- Improvement of **System Protection** and Enhancement of **Communication and Monitoring** with IT (**EMS & DSM**)
- Review of **Generator and Load Trip Strategy** (Under-Voltage and Under-Frequency Trip Levels and Times)
- Use of **FACTS & HVDC** for Reactive-Power Compensation, Power-Flow Control and Prevention of Voltage Collapse
- **Active Damping** of Power Oscillations with **FACTS & HVDC**
- Possibly **more HVDC** in the interconnected US-Canada Areas: **HVDC is a Firewall** against cascading events (Voltage Collapse and Frequency decline): **Québec was not affected !**
- **Increase of Reserve Capacity (HVDC, new Generations)**



**Task Forces were “looking into” their own Systems all over the World**



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# Getting **more Power** out of the Grid



Our Solutions:

**HVDC** – High Voltage DC Transmission Systems

**FACTS** – Flexible AC Transmission Systems






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
# Options of HVDC Interconnections

a)



Can be  
**connected**  
to long AC  
Lines

b)




a) **Back-to-Back Solution**

b) **HVDC Long Distance Transmission**


c) **Integration** of **HVDC** into the **AC System**

# Interconnected system configuration



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# Transmission of additional 2000 MW through the system




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
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# Transmission of additional 2000 MW by HVDC



  
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
# Cost Comparison





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# Integration of HVDC into the system (example)



Share in installed wind energy of 12,223 MW


E. ON Netz:	48 %
Vattenfall Europe Transmission:	37 %
RWE Net:	14 %
EnBW Transportnetze:	1 %






# China: Benefits of active Damping with HVDC & FACTS in a Hybrid AC-DC System

Power Flow in one Line  
Huishui-Hechi (MW)



■ HVDC Converter Station  
 ⚡ TCSC    ⚡ FSC

## Power System



## Dynamic Results

- a – without Power Modulation
- b – with Power Modulation of HVDC Control
- c – further Improvements with Pingguo TCSC/FSC



■ Hydro Power Station    ■ Thermal Power Station




# NORDEL - UCTE Interconnections (Studies for new HVDC Links)

## Topics and Highlights of the Interconnection Studies

### NORDEL

- 90 generators
- 220 nodes
- 320 transmission lines
- 80 transformers



### 8/11 HVDC links

### UCTE/CENTREL

- 400 generators
- 1900 nodes
- 3200 transmission lines
- 940 transformers



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Prospects in China and India: "Smart" and Strong Grids


# Grid Extension in India - Hybrid AC plus DC

## DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL GRID



PHASE - III  
(By 2012)

Similar Perspectives ... as in China



Source: Power Grid Corporation of India, 2003





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# India: East-South HVDC Interconnector



**2003**

**DC Station Kolar – close to Bangalore**






# Basslink HVDC: remote Infeed of **Green Energy**

Hydro Plants for:

- Base Load **and**
- Energy **Storage**



Plus **Wind Power**



**Benefits of HVDC:**

- **Clean Energy**
- **CO<sub>2</sub> Reduction**
- **Cost Reduction**


**2005**





# Initial Conditions in the US Blackout Area: Congestion, Overloads and Loop Flows

Figure 3: Loop Flow of Power Transfer from Wisconsin to TVA



*System Enhancement necessary !*


Source: ITC 8/2003 – “Blackout”

**Problems only in the synchronous interconnected Systems**

Source: National Transmission Grid Study; U.S. DOE 5/2002 – “Preview”





# Elimination of Bottlenecks in Transmission - Prevention of **Overloads** and **Outages**



**Short-Circuit Current Limitation** for Connection of **new Power Plants**

**SVC & HVDC** for Prevention of Voltage Collapse

**Load Management by HVDC**



**The FACTS & HVDC “Application Guide”**

**Load Displacement** by **Series Compensation**



# 500 kV TCSC Serra da Mesa, Furnas/Brazil – Essential for Transmission

- Current Control
- Impedance Control
- Power Oscillation Damping (POD)
- Mitigation of SSR (Option)



- Up to 500 POD Operations per Day for saving the System Stability
- A System Outage of 24 hrs would cost 840,000 US\$ \*

\* 25 US\$/MWh x 1400 MW x 24 hrs

1999

## Benefits:

- Increase of Transmission Capacity
- Improvement of System Stability



> + 60° C  
up to 85°





# Europe: UK goes ahead with FACTS - 27 SVCs

## Example Harker Substation - 2 parallel SVCs



**1993**



# Power System Expansion ...

